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Abstract: This paper evaluates the farmers’ perception of the soil erosion problem, and identifies and analyses 
social capital elements that motivate households to actively participate in soil conservation in agricultural 
production process. The data used in the study was generated using a structured questionnaire in a survey that 
covered 321 households in Kenya’s semi arid districts of Machakos and Taita-Taveta Districts.  Two modelling 
strategies were used: A Probit model was used to estimate the likelihoods of factors that may influence farmers’ 
perception of soil erosion problem, and a Tobit to estimate parameters of factors that influence terracing intensity. 
The results indicate that although perception of the soil erosion problem is relatively high in the study sites, its 
effect on soil conservation investments is not significant. In Machakos, the significant determinants of terracing 
intensity include land tenure, crop area, household size, and membership diversity whereas in Taita-Taveta they 
include age of household head and consumer-worker ratio. Results from the aggregated data show that lagged 
crop output, group membership density and diversity, cognitive social capital and location significantly influence 
the terracing intensity on farm household fields. The policy challenge is to establish and strengthen social capital 
elements that have a strong influence on communities undertaking soil erosion control measures for sustainable 
agriculture and rural development..       
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Land degradation and declining agricultural productivity are often attributed to the traditional land tenure systems 
of managing agricultural land. Among the indicators of land degradation is soil erosion
1. Farmers depend upon 
land for their livelihoods and as Scherr (1999) argues, it is uncommon for them to be unaware of serious soil 
degradation unless they are recent immigrants to a new agro-ecological zone, the process of degradation has not 
yet affected yields, or its cause is invisible. Invisibility of soil erosion can be discounted because it’s a visible 
indicator of soil loss.  
 
In Kenya, most resource poor groups in rural areas are concentrated on low potential lands where inadequate or 
unreliable rainfall, adverse soil conditions, fertility, and topography limit agricultural productivity and increase the 
risk of land degradation. The attempts of such groups to improve their livelihoods often lead to over-exploitation 
of land and water resources. Given these facts, resource management by poor households is crucial in dealing with 
the development and poverty problems facing Kenya.  
 
Land degradation in Kenya, as in most other developing countries, manifests itself in rapid rates of natural capital 
depletion, exemplified by forest degradation and soil erosion especially in river basins. The situation is worse in 
the marginal lands (which constitute about 80 percent of the total agricultural land) where there is serious 
environmental deterioration largely due to increasing human and animal pressure. These areas are faced with 
frequent food shortages, are ecologically vulnerable and receive irregular and low amounts of rainfall. They also 
face serious problems of environmental degradation such as soil erosion and soil mining. While efforts have been 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding Author: E-Mail Address gobare@africaonline.co.ke 
1 Other forms of soil degradation are damages to physical and chemical properties of soil, reduction in 
moisture capacity, and soil mining. made to motivate land users to efficiently use the land resource, soil conservation been given limited attention in 
agricultural policy. Even less considered is social capital.  
 
In the traditional African setting, it has been argued that individuals are generally social and that the level of social 
interaction in all spheres of life is relatively high. Such interaction can be captured from a social perspective in 
social capital and subjected to empirical analysis from an economic context. We argue that if soil erosion presents 
a potential threat to an individual’s livelihood the society will be concerned and that it will mobilize resources to 
mitigate any negative impacts that may arise. While the importance of social capital has long been recognized in 
other social sciences (see e.g. Coleman 1988; Putman, 1995; and Granovetter, 1985), it has only recently received 
attention in the economics literature (e.g. Narayan and Pritchet, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Temple and 
Johnson, 1998; Grootaert, 2001; Haddad and Malucio, 2002; and La Ferara, 2002; Uphoff and Wijayaratina, 
2000, among others) it has had minimal reference in economics. This is particularly true in so far as production 
and soil resource management in the agricultural sub-sector of an economy is concerned.  
 
Agricultural production is often defined by the level of conventional inputs such as physical capital and labour 
employed in the process but social capital can compliment the process if only as an arbiter of transaction costs. 
High transaction costs have been attributed to inadequacy in coverage and quality of rural road infrastructure 
(Obare et al, 2003, and Omamo, 1998). Social capital should, also, facilitate scale economies in resources that 
have no market price. Yet it is minimally or never factored into economic analyses that have a bearing on resource 
use and management especially with respect to the agricultural sub-sector of developing country economies.  
 
There is glaring paucity of information of any rigorous analyses to estimate the contribution of social capital in a 
marginally agricultural setting in soil erosion control and management in Kenya. For example Frank, et al (2002) 
analyzed the effect of group structural variables on performance in an activity like tree nurseries in high potential 
zones of Kirinyaga and Nyeri districts and less favourable zones of Meru and Embu districts, while de Haan, et al 
(1996) examined the performance of dairy groups in Kenya. In the Philippines Cramb (2004) examines the effect 
of social capital on terracing in humid tropics. This paper aims to fill this gap using data from a 2003 survey of 
farming households in selected marginal areas of Kenya. We use a Heckman’s two-stage regression to estimate a 
perception of soil erosion problem sample selection Probit and a least square regression to establish the likelihood 
of a vector of variables in influencing terracing intensity in erosion-prone and agriculturally marginal areas. A 
specific feature of the modelling strategy is the incorporation of a farmer specific perception of the soil erosion 
problem. We argue that any investment in soil erosion control measures will be preceded by the appreciation by 
individual farmers of the seriousness of the soil erosion problem and that social capital plays a role in sensitization 
of the problem. The perception and terracing intensity equations reveal possible reasonable impacts of social 
capital attributes whose policy implications centre on establishing and strengthening those elements that have a 






The study areas are in agro-ecological zone IV (see Jaetzold and Schmidt, 1983). This zone is a transition 
between semi-arid and semi-humid, depending on altitude. It is characterised by having between 115 and 145 
growing days (medium to medium/short growing season) and annual mean temperature between 15 and 18
0C in 
the Lower Highland zone. The Upper Midland zone has between 75-104 growing days (short to very short 




The data for this study are a result of a survey of rural households in Machakos and Taita-Taveta Districts 
conducted in 2003. Four sub-locations were chosen in each district on the basis of terracing density and physical 
infrastructural endowments such as road network.  Two sub-locations with higher terracing density but with 
higher and lower physical infrastructural endowments were selected in each district. Likewise, two sub-locations 
with lower terracing density but with higher and lower physical infrastructural endowments were also selected.  A 
village was then selected randomly from each of the sub-locations. The survey instrument was administered to 40 
randomly selected households in each village.  
 
The model  
The study is conceptualised around the likelihood of adopting soil control measures to mitigate soil problem. We 
assume that any investment undertaken by a farm household to control soil erosion will depend on the farmer’s 
perception of the seriousness of the soil erosion problem in so far as it affects the household’s livelihood. In this 
case we conceptualize a binary perception outcome: soil erosion is a problem (1) or it is not a problem (0). 
Depending on the perception outcome an individual farmer is likely to make a decision that will mitigate the 
consequences of the erosion problem. We anticipate that the outcome of this decision will be observable in soil 
control measures in a form of terraces. The perception model enables us thus to select a sample that has made 
investments in terracing. The underlying logic is that an individual cannot invest in terraces in an effort to control 
soil erosion if the same individual doesn’t acknowledge the existence of soil erosion problem. In linking up the 
two outcomes we assume that acknowledgement of a soil erosion problem precedes an investment decision. Thus 
any observable terrace investment precedes an “acknowledgement of the soil erosion function.” Subsequently the 
output (i.e. observed terraces) is as a result of a two-step process. Following Greene (2000) consider a model 
consisting of two equations. The first equation is the “selection equation,”
2 which is defined as  




i 1 = + γ =    (1) 
where 
*
i z  is a latent variable, γ is a Kx1 vector of parameters, 
'
i w is a 1xK row vector of observations on K 
exogenous variables and  i u is a random disturbance. The latent variable is unobservable, but we do observe the 












    (2) 
The second equation is the linear model of primary interest.
3 It is given as 
n N n i e x y i i i > = + = , ,....., 1 , β
'  (3) 
where  i y  is an observable random variable, β  is an Mx1 vector of parameters, 
'
i x  is a 1xM vector of exogenous 






































   (4) 
To avoid a “selectivity problem” a two-step estimation procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) and clarified by 
Greene (1981) was employed. We estimate a “perception of soil erosion problem” selection Probit and a primary 
terracing intensity least square regression model in order to draw conclusions on a larger population of farming 
communities in the study areas. We specify the empirical models as 
)
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dummyex , sex , particip , groups , memdive
, faror , hhicome , tenure , slope , maktaccess , farmca , hhs , educ , age f terrace =
 (6) 
The variable description and measurements are presented in Table 1. Since most of the variables presented are 
self explanatory we briefly discuss the social capital elements that we considered in this study. The elements 
include: groups, membership diversity, and household participation in group dynamics in a form of decision 
making – either directly or indirectly.  Membership diversity was measured through rating according to five 
criteria: religion, gender, age, political affiliation, and education.  A diversity score was then calculated for each 
organization, ranging from one to two (A value of one on each criterion indicates that members of the 
organization are “mostly from the same” religious affiliations, gender and so on; while a value of two indicates 
they come from mostly  different groups). These scores were then summed up per household to generate a 
                                                 
2 The selection equation in our case is captured by the perception of soil erosion function 
3 This model captures the soil erosion control efforts which in our case is indicated by the terracing intensity diversity index. This index procedure assumes that each criterion has the same weight in measuring the overall 
diversity of membership. 
 
Regarding participation, it is generally believed that organizations that follow a democratic pattern of decision-
making are more effective than others. This makes us know which ones are more democratic than the others. The 
two questions (a) respondent evaluation of the relative roles of the leader and the members in reaching decisions 
and, (b) respondent overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the organization leader; can be combined in a 
“democratic functioning score” to determine the diversity score namely: 1 = the leader decides and informs the 
group, 2= the leader asks group members for their views and then decides, 3= the group members hold a 
discussion and decide together on one hand and 1= the leader is not effective, 2=the leader is somewhat effective, 
and 3= the leader is very effective.
4  These scores are then added up for each household. 
 
Table 1: Description and measurement of variables 
 
Variable  Description Measurement 
district  Location of study site  Dummy: Machakos=1, Taita-Taveta=0. 
age01  Age of household head  Years 
hhs  Household size  Number of persons 
terrace  Length of terrace   Metres per hectare 
slope  Slope of land parcels  Simple  scale: 1=low flat, 2=low slope, 
3=medium slope, 4=steep slope 
tenure  Land tenure security  Simple increasing scale of tenure security (1 
to 7) 
groups  Number of groups that a household
member belongs to 
Simple increasing scale 
memdive  Membership diversity  Simple increasing scale 
particip  Participation in decision-making  Simple increasing scale 
educ  Education of household head  Number of years in formal schooling 
sex  Sex of household head  1=Male, 0=female  
farmsize  Size of the farm   Hectares 
faror  Degree of farm orientation  Fraction of off-farm income in total household 
income 
famca  Farm size per capita  Hectares per person 
hhincome  Household income  Kenya shillings 
hhincomepc  Household income per capita  Kenya shillings 
age  Age of household head  Number of years 
mktaccess  Access costs to markets  Kenya shillings 
erode  Erosion status  1= eroded or 0=not eroded 
perc  Perception of soil erosion problem  Problem=1, not a problem=0 
dummyex  Contact with extension staff  Yes=1, No=0 
Source: Case study household survey 
 
The groups variable captures the number of groups in the study areas to which members of a household belong. It 
is a good indicator of the various sources of information that a household has access to. The variable is computed 
by the summation of the groups that all members of a household belong to in order to generate a measurable 
index for the group variable. 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Household socio-economic characteristics 
  
The descriptive statistics for selected variables are presented in Table 2. They indicate both the disaggregated (by 
district) and pooled statistics. The average age of the household head in Taita-Taveta district significantly higher 
                                                 
4 Effective here means that the leader manages and actively participates in mobilizing members in effecting 
decisions that have been made by the group in addition to being innovative in initiating developing agenda. (about 52) compared to Machakos district (48 years). The same applies to the mean values of perception of the 
soil erosion problem (perc) and the gender of household head (sex). The average values of terracing intensity 
(terraces), farm orientation (faror), number of groups (groups), market access (mktacces) and soil erosion status 
(erode) variables are significantly higher in Machakos than in Taita-Taveta. The significance of comparative 
means of variables are indicative of the likely effects that they may have on soil erosion control investments some 
of which appear to be location specific. Individual perception, and therefore, the subsequent negative effects, 
would necessarily spur action that would mitigate the effects that would arise from non-intervention. Soil erosion 
or generally soil degradation is a process that takes a long time for the consequences to be appreciated and only 
then if those affected are able to directly associate them to that process.  
 
The mean market access costs (mktacces) of 107 in Machakos and 90 in Taita-Taveta are significantly different 
and this should have a bearing on returns from agricultural economic activities in the two study sites yet the 
household income both in absolute and in per capita terms are not significantly different. Perhaps this would be 
explained by the existing market for outputs and inputs both temporally and spatially. At least Machakos district 
has spatially a relatively dense consumption demand sites in the form of Machakos town and even the distance to 
Nairobi city is small. In Taita-Taveta on the other hand the supply outlets are thin and the nearest high demand 
market (i.e. Mombasa is relatively far). 
 




   N Mean 
Std. 





ageh01  146 47.82  14.85  144 51.49  15.02  -2.097** 
educ  151 6.82  3.91  105 7.24  3.84  -0.85 
terraces  152 951.07 1293.83  144 613.66  2098.68  1.675* 
hhs  152 6.03  2.61  144 6.47  2.75 -0.408 
Farmca  149 0.35  0.58  144 0.46  0.65 -0.421 
mktacces  152 107.17  19.13  144  90.42  36.58 4.974*** 
slope  149 2.33  0.87  140 2.19  0.85  1.307 
tenure  148 5.90  1.24  144 5.85  0.99  0.368 
hhincome  152 63162.63 181637.56  140 43537.48  88332.86  1.158 
hhincomepc  152 1153.65 27930.00  140 8447.67  22297.19  0.91 
farmsize  149 1.98  3.47  144 2.54  3.31 -1.425 
faror  152 0.33  0.36  140 0.28  0.36  1.155** 
perc  152 0.59  0.49  144 0.74  0.44  -2.757*** 
memdive  125 14.48  7.24  67 14.03  8.33  0.389 
groups  152 1.24  0.91  144 0.72  0.98  4.744*** 
particip  125 7.53  4.56  67 7.07  3.96  0.686 
erode  151 0.89  0.32  143 0.79  0.41  2.286** 
Sex  152 0.93  0.26  144 0.80  0.40  3.293*** 
dummyex  149 0.21  0.41  143 0.34  0.48  -2.599*** 
Note: Std. means standard; N is the number of respondents 
a Mean difference test with equal variances assumed 
* P< 0.10, ** P <0.05 and ***P<0.01. 
Source: Case study household survey  
Household income is a good indicator of the welfare of the affected households. The mean annual household 
incomes (hhincome) in the study areas are about Ksh 63,000 and Ksh 43,000 in Machakos and Taita-Taveta 
districts, respectively. However, the mean household income per capita (hhincomepc) of Ksh 8,448 is higher in 
Taita-Taveta district compared to Ksh 1,154 that is observed in Machakos district. Although the mean differences 
are not significant we observe that studied households are seemingly poor when considered against the 
background that by 1998 the mean value of crop production from farm production alone by poor households in 
Kenya was about Ksh 3,285 (Republic of Kenya, First Report on Poverty in Kenya – Vol. II, 1998). 
 
The average farm size (farmsize) in Taita-Taveta is about 2.5 hectares (ha) compared to Machakos with a mean 
size of approximately 2 ha. The mean difference is insignificant. The average farm sizes of between 2 and 2.5 ha 
compare favourably to that of a sample from several districts in the high potential agricultural areas of Kenya by 
Jayne, et al (1998) which measure 5.9 acres (approx. 2.39 ha) and yet the study sites are found in marginal areas 
of Kenya. Since the household sizes are more or less similar while the mean farm sizes are relatively different in 
the two sites it follows therefore that the mean per capita farm size (farmca) is also different. The mean farm per 
capita measures 0.35 ha in Machakos and 0.46 ha in Taita-Taveta. 
 
The mean terrace length per hectare (terrace) in Machakos is higher than in Taita-Taveta. This would be due to 
several potential reasons: First, soil conservation campaigns have been more sustained and intense in Machakos 
than in Taita-Taveta. Secondly, the income status would have provided an impetus to invest more in terracing 
although it would also be argued that due to terracing and hence soil conservation, farmers in Machakos District 
were able to improve their incomes from agriculture. The mean household size (hhs) in both sites is 6 members. 
The mean values of farm slope index (slope), education level of household head (educ) and the land tenure system 
(tenure) vary although the values are not significantly different in the two. Nevertheless, we expect these 
variables are likely to have an effect on soil conservation.  
 
Perception of the soil erosion and determinants of terracing intensity  
 
In Table 3 shows the results of the Heckman’s two-step regression, following estimation of (5) and (6), for the 
two sampled sites are presented. The sigma values are greater than zero which shows that the two equations are 
independent. The Wald χ
2 statistics are significant indicating the rejection of the null hypotheses which posit that 
the estimated coefficients are equal to zero. The Mills’ lambda is significant with respect to the Machakos sub-
sample which means that selection is important. 
 
In the dis-aggregated results age of household head (ageh01) coefficient is positive only for Taita-Taveta. It is 
evident, therefore, that in Taita-Taveta the older
5 the household head s/he is likely to acknowledge the soil erosion 
problem and this perhaps reinforces the need to construct terraces for the sole purpose of reducing soil erosion 
effects. Another possible explanation is that the older the decision makers the lower their discount rates on 
investments in new innovations. 
 
Table 3: Heckman’s two-step regression results  
 
Machakos (N=113)  Taita-Taveta (N=45)  Pooled (N=158)  Variable 
Coefficient Std.  Err. Coefficient Std. Err.   Coefficient  Std. Err 
Perception (perc) equation: a Probit specification 
ageh01  -0.004 0.003  -0.007* 0.004  0.0016  0.0046 
educ  -0.046*** 0.013  -0.009 0.014  -0.0233  0.0166 
slope  0.090* 0.051  -0.033 0.060  0.1234*  0.0712 
tenure  -0.098** 0.040  0.064 0.062  -0.0642  0.0557 
faror  -0.517*** 0.113  0.081 0.123  -0.5350***  0.1643 
memdive  0.018 0.040  -0.037 0.034  -0.0634  0.0508 
groups  -0.396 0.411  0.363 0.344  0.4667  0.4938 
                                                 
5 Age is a good proxy for farming experience. particip  0.031 0.030  0.021 0.022  0.0120  0.0294 
erode  0.524*** 0.141  0.806*** 0.110  0.6745***  0.1689 
sex  0.007 0.184  0.091 0.111  -0.2327  0.1918 
dummyex  -0.228** 0.107  -0.165 0.112  -0.1825  0.1364 
Constant  1.354*** 0.391  0.165 0.431  0.6116  0.5040 
terraces (terraces) selection equation 
district        -1.3113***  0.3891 
ageh01  -0.021 0.030  0.115* 0.069  0.0259*  0.0138 
educ  -0.112 0.110  -0.228 0.221  0.0402  0.0468 
hhs  0.691** 0.285  -0.859* 0.456  0.0839  0.0712 
farmca  1.250 1.189  -4.988* 2.683  -0.1901  0.2089 
mktacces  -0.019 0.018  -0.026 0.017  -0.0032  0.0056 
slope  1.111** 0.520  1.194 0.738  0.3756*  0.2024 
tenure  0.765** 0.331  -1.599* 0.894  0.1741  0.1355 
hhincome  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.0000  0.0000 
faror  -0.492 0.896  -4.166 2.593  -0.4911  0.3951 
memdive  -1.106** 0.544  -0.763 0.704  -0.3403**  0.1336 
groups  11.055** 5.458  5.635 6.248 3.2036**  1.2876 
particip  -0.206 0.212  0.288 0.444  -0.0351  0.0879 
erode  1.160 0.820  -1.703 2.186  0.2736  0.3940 
sex  -4.483 3.369  -1.806 1.933  -1.2738**  0.6308 
dummyex  -1.217 0.749  0.741 0.995  -0.1516  0.3342 
Constant 0.107    17.755  11.972  0.8873  1.5373 
Mills  lambda  -0.370** 0.186  -0.168 0.166  0.6314  0.3064 
rho  -0.948   -0.756   1.0000  
sigma  0.390   0.223   0.6314  
lambda  -0.370 0.186  -0.168 0.166  0.6314  0.3064 
Wald χ
2(22) 79.91  89.36  49.17  
Note: Std. Err. denotes standard error 
*P< 0.10, **P <0.05 and ***P<0.01. 
 
Farm size per capita (farmca) has negative and significant effect on terrace intensity in Taita-Taveta district. A 
possible explanation would be that the bigger land size per capita implies less pressure on land for agricultural 
activities from the farm household perspective and subsequently there is likely to be less motivation for 
intensified terracing of farms.  The slope of the farm (slope) has a positive and significant effect on terrace 
intensity and particularly in Machakos district. The same effect is also evidenced in the aggregated results. The 
positive effect observed in Machakos would be as a result of the sustained campaign on soil conservation that has 
been promoted for a longer time compared to Taita-Taveta district. It is also apparent from the descriptive results 
that Machakos district is relatively hilly than Taita-Taveta with the result that even without any external influence 
farmers are likely to undertake measures to control soil erosion. In general it is likely to expect steeply sloping 
farms to have some terracing activities as evidenced from the pooled results. We also note, however, that the 
larger farms are likely to have large crop fields. All things being equal, effects of erosive element will develop 
more on, and be discernible more on larger than smaller field. 
 
The land tenure security variable has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of observing intensified 
terracing for soil erosion control in both Machakos and Taita-Taveta districts. This suggests that farm households 
with insecure land tenure rights are unlikely to make any investments in soil erosion control measures. This 
finding is consistent with empirical evidence (e.g. Feder and Onchan, 1987; Matlon, 1994; Hayes, et al, 1997; 
Roth, et al, 1994; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998) which suggest that the type of investments undertaken and the resultant land productivity in any given farmland as being among other a function of tenure security.
6 Education 
variable does not significantly influence terracing intensity although the estimated coefficients are negative. This 
is a surprising result since we expect education to have a significant bearing on resource management on the farm 
including terraces as an indicator of soil and water management. Possibly the more educated people are, the more 
likely they will secure off-farm jobs and their managerial inputs on farm level activities may be insignificant.  
 
Social capital elements of membership diversity (memdive) and the density of membership in groups (groups) 
significantly shape terracing intensity in Machakos only although they appear to have similar effects when the 
data are aggregated. Participation does not influence terrace investments. Membership diversity negatively 
influences terracing intensity. This is an interesting result since it implies that an organization with different 
characteristics such as age, religion, political affiliation and occupation presents greater opportunities for soil 
conservation information sharing would be wrong. Possibly greater membership variability is likely to create 
conflicts or that such people cannot easily mesh up and form one group. As Balland and Platteau (1996) argue, 
collective action is successful with homogenous groups.  
 
The significant effect of density of membership in groups in terracing especially in Machakos suggest, possibly, 
the importance of networking since it is evident that as density of membership’s increase, the likelihood of 
deciding to terrace and also the terracing intensity will increase. Furthermore, membership into groups connects 
one to a variety of people and thereby to a wide information base which may lead to a higher terracing intensity. 
The other element of social capital such as participation (particip) is not significant. This implies that extent of 
participation in decision making does not influence both the decision to terrace and also terracing intensity.  
 
Extension (dummyex) does not have a significant effect on perception although positive as expected with Taita-
Taveta and the combined data set. As argued earlier this points to ineffectiveness of the extension service. Yet this 
is a variable that should condition the diffusion of information about soil erosion problems existing in the area.  
Alternatively, the aspect of soil erosion does not feature in the extension packages to enable the households to 
internalize soil erosion problem in relation to sustainable agriculture and agricultural productivity. 
 
The location variable (district) is negative and significant. It is therefore evident that Machakos has significantly 
higher level of soil conservation investments compared to Taita-Taveta. This reflects a greater propensity for 
Machakos farmers to undertake investments to prevent soil erosion and conserve moisture. This may have to do 
with learning and copying social dimensions. In Machakos, some of this learning was in the form of an exogenous 
shock (Tiffen et al. 1994). Terrace construction also started much earlier in Machakos compared to Taita-Taveta, 
in which case there was enough time for diffusion to spread the technology to other farmers.  
 
Table 5: Tobit regression results on determinants of terracing intensity 
  
Taita-Taveta (N=33)  Machakos (N=99)  Pooled (N=132)  Variable 
Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t| Coefficient P>|t|
district  - -  - -  -0.046(0.286) 0.874 
ageh01   0.025(0.020) 0.228  0.006(0.008) 0.483  0.015(0.008) 0.044 
educ   -0.093(0.058) 0.126  0.030(0.033) 0.362  0.034(0.029) 0.246 
hhs   0.222(0.138) 0.126  0.058(0.037) 0.114  0.070(0.038) 0.068 
farmca  1.307(0.838) 0.137  0.439(0.149) 0.004  0.421(0.155) 0.007 
mktacces   0.011(0.006) 0.085  0.006(0.006) 0.251  -0.001(0.004) 0.858 
slope   -0.787(0.274) 0.010  0.286(0.123) 0.023  0.099(0.109) 0.365 
tenure  0.410(0.300) 0.191  -0.010(0.090) 0.912  0.032(0.092) 0.726 
hhincome  0.000(0.000) 0.020  0.000(0.000) 0.941  0.000(0.000) 0.869 
faror   0.367(0.649) 0.579  -0.044(0.300) 0.885  -0.249(0.271) 0.361 
perc   0.361(0.760) 0.641  -0.130(0.242) 0.594  -0.223(0.238) 0.351 
memdive   -0.202(0.160) 0.223  0.055(0.106) 0.605  -0.154(0.085) 0.073 
                                                 
6 In Kenya, though, even squatters can be seen putting soil conservation structures in place in order to strengthen 
their claim groups   2.226(1.574) 0.175  -1.133(1.097) 0.305  1.168(0.871) 0.183 
particip   -0.083(0.085) 0.342  0.127(0.071) 0.078  0.041(0.049) 0.412 
erode   -0.594(0.745) 0.436  0.892(0.362) 0.016  0.634(0.324) 0.053 
sex   -0.742(0.403) 0.083  -1.234(0.425) 0.005  -0.664(0.310) 0.034 
dummyex   0.701(0.432) 0.123  -0.237(0.265) 0.376  -0.145(0.226) 0.523 
Constant   2.514(2.540)  0.336  4.537(1.080) 0.000  4.926(1.072) 0.000 
Std.  Err.    0.859(0.111) -  0.887(0.064) -  0.988(0.062) - 
Log 
likelihood  -41.225 -128.624  -185.611 
Prob>χ
2 0.039  0.015  0.060 
Note: The dependent variable values have been transformed through natural log to reduce dispersion. Figures in 
parenthesis are standard errors. Bolded coefficient values are significant. 
 
 
In Table 5 Tobit model estimation results are presented. The estimated model incorporated all the variables that 
were considered in the Heckman’s two-step regression model. However, the perception of the soil erosion 
problem (perc) variable explicitly specified as an independent variable. The dependent variable is terracing 
intensity (terrace). The results show that perception of soil erosion problem does not directly translate into a 
higher likelihood of increasing investment in soil erosion control through increased terrace intensity or length. 
Therefore the two-step regression better captures the effect of perception indirectly as a selection variable of 
samples that exhibit differential terracing. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The study has established that elements of social capital have a significant role to play in soil conservation in 
marginal areas. It has also been established that social capital is of various forms and they do not act in the same 
direction. Three elements of social capital were considered useful in this study namely: density of memberships in 
a form of the number of groups that a household belongs to, membership diversity in terms the concentration of 
social groups that are active in the study area, and active participation in decision making within the groups that a 
household is a member. Generally these components of social capital do not influence the likelihood of 
acknowledging in terms of raising awareness of the soil erosion problem. These finding is surprising since we did 
expect that extensive interaction in social groups will add up to information that would influence perception of 
soil erosion as a problem. Yet it will seem to suggest that policy makers need not worry about diversity of 
membership nor the participation in decision making by members of groups.    
 
Nevertheless, the number of the number of groups that a household members belong to, the higher the likelihood 
of a household intensifying investments in terraces in an effort to control the soil erosion problem. Group 
participation in decision making has no discernable influence on terrace intensity. On the other hand membership 
diversity influences terrace intensity but negatively. In this scenario, the policy challenge is to come up with 
innovative and cost-effective measures to encourage household membership into groups. One option is to use the 
existing groups to remove ceiling on membership and farther encourage people to join. However, in the view that 
collective action is more successful with smaller groups (Balland and Platteau, 1996), our considered view is to 
increase the number of groups. This often occurs when non-governmental organizations move in to new areas. 
Most of these set up committees as part of their community mobilization. With this, new groups are being formed. 
Another option would be to keep groups that have already been formed active. Besides, once a need that made 
group be formed in the first place is fulfilled, it is likely that a group may be come inactive. Assisted formulation 
of new goals or objectives around the same membership such as rotating savings (merry-go-rounds) may help 
overcome such a pitfall.  
 
The effects of selected socio-economic variables have either global or location specific effects on perception of 
soil erosion problem and also on terracing intensity. For example education, land tenure security, farm orientation 
and extension do influence negatively influence perception of soil erosion as a problem in Machakos district. On 
the other hand the slope of farm fields and the state of erosion do positively and significantly improve perception 
of soil erosion problem. Age of the household head negatively influences the perception variable whereas field 
soil erosion status does influence perception positively in Taita-Taveta district. Some of these results are contrary 
to our expectations and subsequently difficult to account for. We therefore suggest more research into the subject matter. Nevertheless the results that extension has not improved the perception of soil erosion problem raises 
concern about the packaging of the extension messages or the effectiveness of the extension agency in the 
advocacy and sensitization programs to farmers on the seriousness of the problem that needs farmers attention. 
 
Terracing, as soil erosion control measure, can and should be handled by individual households who have rights 
of use of the land resource. Household size, slope, and tenure significantly and positively influence the likelihood 
of increased terracing in Machakos district. In Taita-Taveta district only age of household head accounts for 
likelihood of increased terrace intensity while household size, farm capital, and land tenure security are likely to 
account for reduced terrace intensity. The policy implication is that socio economic factors do matter in soil 
erosion control efforts. However, since their effect appear to be location specific any policy intervention geared 
towards increasing terraces on farm fields would apparently vary spatially. Improving land tenure security would 
significantly improve soil conservation in terms of terracing in Machakos district whereas the converse appears to 
be true with respect to Taita-Taveta district.  The Taita-Taveta results may however not be very reliable 
considering the sample size of 40. More research may provide additional insights into the effects of these 
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